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Introduction 
 
In 2011 a group was formed in Northern Mali (Figure 1), naming itself the Mouvement national de 
liberation de l’Azawad or MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad). Its aim was to 
create a new nation-state, Azawad, independent from Mali and foreign forces. This most recent 
rebellion was the largest to date and is said to have included several different ethnic groups, but is 
largely instigated by the Tuareg, a sub-group of Berbers1. Published one year before the start of the 
rebellion, Tuareg Society Within a Globalized World (2010) by Anja Fischer and Ines Kohl gives an 
in-depth introduction to the events leading up to the creation of the MNLA in 2011. Fischer and 
Kohl’s book aims to answer the question of what globalization means for nomadic people by 
specifically looking at the Tuareg, one of the ethnic groups living transnationally in Mali, Libya, 
Algeria, Niger and Burkino Faso. The term Tuareg is a colonial construct—Fischer and Kohl prefer to 
use the term Kel Tamasheq, which is how the people of this group refer to themselves. In order to 
avoid confusion, the term Kel Tamasheq will be used in my thesis, since it is an emic term.2 
The 2011 rebellion was not the first of its kind. There have been three since Malian 
independence from France in 1960, but none have resulted in satisfactory or long-term peace 
agreements.3 Anthropological sources such as Fischer and Kohl as well as military analysis by 
Patricio Asfura-Heim show that the War on Terror has been used by national governments to castigate 
minority groups, including the Kel Tamasheq.4 The nature of this movement—from here on referred 
to as MNLA—is that its main cultural support comes from a group of artists who call themselves the 
Artist Association Azawad or ax3. The founder of this group and main artist creating the visual 
material for the movement is Mazou Ibrahim Touré, an artist who comes from two ethnic groups: Kel 
Tamasheq and Songhai. Another member is Moussa Ag Assarid, a writer, who is also considered the 
representative for the MNLA in Europe.5 While there has been research on the colonial legacy in the 
Sahara, the tourist gaze in the region and the history of the Kel Tamasheq uprisings, there still 
remains a gap in research on the visual language used within the movement. By looking at the use of 
visual material by the MNLA and the interaction with the public, it can be a case study for a 
contemporary separatist movement and within that movement the creation of a multicultural visual 
national identity. The central question of this thesis is how these visual works create a group identity 
by making of the public a group that creates instead of consumes, as well as how this position of the 
public changes with the context between art and activism.  
The purpose here is not to determine whether the claims of independence are legitimate, but 
to look instead at how the artist group attempts to legitimize itself and, in a broader aspect, legitimize 																																																								
1 Asfura-Heim 2013, 3.  
2 Fischer and Kohl 2010, 2. 
3 Asfura-Heim 2013, 5. 
4 Asfura-Heim et al. 2010, 213. 
5 Malzacher et al. 2015. 
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Azawad. While there are currently many groups across the world attempting to get recognition from 
other nations, Azawad is particularly interesting because of its multi-ethnic demographic. The MNLA 
sees itself as a multi-ethnic movement, but this should not be taken as evidence, many of the works, 
including those in this thesis, have come from the Kel Tamasheq, not the other ethnic groups which 
live in the region. The efforts of the MNLA gained traction in the Netherlands when the artist Jonas 
Staal collaborated with Moussa Ag Assarid to participate in events in Berlin (Germany) and Utrecht 
(the Netherlands).  
The visual language of the movement has largely been created by Mazou Ibrahim Touré and 
has since been taken over by the other groups living in Azawad. Touré describes his start in the 
MNLA to Jonas Staal in an interview, 
I realized that I could develop banners and forms of calligraphy that were far more 
beautiful and effective than the ones the MNLA had been working with. […] I have 
made banners and slogans for every public manifestation ever since. These slogans of the 
day express the poetry of the revolution. I also helped the protestors who were too timid 
to express themselves with ease. In general, I wanted the rallies to become a space of joy, 
a moment of festivity. This is how the slogan “Azawad! Mali Non!” [Azawad! Mali No!] 
came into being.6 
The slogans and banners that have been created don’t exist solely within a local context. Through 
artists such as Jonas Staal, founder of the New World Academy, the MNLA and its artists have been 
given a platform to present their demands on a global scale. Their aim to be recognized by other 
nation-states brings with it the question of where the people living in Azawad are placed. The lack of 
infrastructure built by the Mali government in the North since its independence from France opens up 
an argument for considering the MNLA as those on the margins. We are dealing with participatory 
works that can exist in the space in between art and activism. The question is then, how do these 
visual works function to create a visual identity of this group and how does this group identity 
mediate the art and activism spectrum. The proposed nation of Azawad works well in this discussion 
since we are dealing with a territory composed of groups that speak multiple languages, meaning that 
the primary language used to communicate group ideology is visual as opposed to textual. 
The thesis is structured in three parts. The first two chapters focus on the visual works as they 
are presented within Azawad. The reason for this structure is to attempt to get an understanding of the 
public’s involvement within Azawad itself. Though Jonas Staal has done much research for his 
project and he is used as a source in the first two chapters, the third chapter makes clear what his 
involvement has been in the dissemination of the visual works. In the first chapter, ‘Public 
monuments and the emancipating public’, the focus is put on the use of monuments to form a national 
identity. How do these visualisations in the public space come to represent a multi-cultural group on 
the margins? By using theories on the ‘other’ and the ‘self’, relational aesthetics, and emancipation 																																																								
6 Touré in Staal 2014a, 91. 
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we can see how the public within Azawad participates. The second chapter, ‘The flag as nation ritual’, 
is on Azawad’s most prominent symbol, its flag. This chapter aims to answer the question of what the 
flag’s role in the visual works is and how this functions for a group on the margins. The ritual use of 
the flag is described along with the different forms—or translations—of the flag. Additionally, it 
addresses the more problematic aspect of drawing on pre-existing notions of the national ‘self’ and 
the role the flag plays in this.  
The final chapter shows how the artist Jonas Staal brought the MNLA and the proposed territory of 
Azawad to the international stage. What happens when the visual works created by this group 
attempting to be emancipated enters the arts environment? Staal introduced the MNLA with his 
project ‘New World Academy’, The Art of Creating a State as well as inviting the MNLA to other 
conferences within the context of international artist and worker’s rights movements. Avoiding a 
discussion on whether or not the works are art, in this thesis they are referred to instead as visual 
interventions.  
The role of Jonas Staal has been limited in the first two chapters. While the chapters make use 
of the figures shown in the publication The Art of Creating a State, most of these photographs were 
taken by Moussa Ag Assarid, a representative of the MNLA. What is discussed in chapters one and 
two are the specific works shown in the photographs, not the photographs themselves nor the role 
Jonas Staal has had in their wider dissemination. This last point is instead what comes to light in the 
final chapter. One additional problem is attributing works to their creators. The only individual named 
as a creator of the visual works shown in the photographs is Ibrahim Touré. Many of the works are 
not attributed to a specific person. Where possible, works that can be attributed to a specific artist are 
noted in the caption and text. 
Amelie de Haan 
s11989855 
 
Chapter 1: Public monuments and emancipating the audience 
 
The use of public space in northern Mali is what stands at the centre of this first chapter. Given the 
name ‘Azawad’, the area claimed by the group called the ‘Mouvement National de Liberation de 
l’Azawad’ or MNLA spans across part of the Sahara encompassing several cities and many smaller 
towns and villages, but consists mostly of uninhabited desert. The region is known for its music7 but 
in this chapter it is the visual projects in public spaces that will be discussed, specifically its 
monuments. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a monument as a “structure or site of historical 
importance”.8 This is the definition that is used in this chapter. Comparing the projects in Azawad 
with those monuments commissioned by the state a decade earlier in the capital of Mali, Bamako, 
shows that using public space to interact with and influence the public is not a local phenomenon. 
This chapter does not discuss the symbols within the public works;9 focusing instead on what role the 
public has in both the creation of these works and the creation of the meaning of these works.  
The chapter is divided in four sections dealing with different forms of public art. The first, on 
the appropriation of pre-existing monuments, deals with the relationship between a MNLA monument 
in Kidal and a Malian monument in the capital in Bamako in a bid to find links in their functions. It 
investigates the role of an ‘other’ in the creation and use of these newly created, or re-appropriated 
monuments.  
The second section introduces Nicolas Bourriaud’s concept of ‘relational aesthetics’. The 
term is used here as meaning a work which “takes as its theoretical horizon the sphere of human 
interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an autonomous and private symbolic 
space.”10 Bourriaud claims this form of aesthetics formed out of the urbanization of the makers of 
visual culture, making it particularly interesting in terms of the visual projects of Azawad that, with 
the exception of work on the physical border of what is considered Azawad, are placed within the 
context of meeting places. These are urban spaces where the different inhabitants of Azawad meet. 
Introducing the concept of emancipation by Ernesto Laclau allows for a further discussion of the 
creation of an ‘other’ with these monuments. 
The third part considers the creation of a work on a public square where it was the public who 
was both responsible for the creation of the project and its continuing expansion. Using the same 
concept of relational aesthetics, the square, which is claimed here to be a work of relational aesthetics, 
is compared with a different project where the role of the public is distinctly different.  
The final section describes the border as a monument and the role of the public in an 
uninhabited space. It describes how the border fulfils the requirements of a nationalist monument and 
how this again aides the creation of an ‘other’. The role of Jonas Staal has been limited in this chapter 																																																								
7 Wendt 1997 
8 Oxford English Dictionary. 
9 For a discussion on symbols, see chapter 2, page 19. 
10 Bourriaud in Bishop 2006a, 160. 
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in an attempt to allow for a closer reading of only the monuments instead of their significance for 
Staal’s theories on stateless democracies. Since he has discussed the concept of the border in 
contemporary nations, this view will briefly be addressed.  
These four sections form the first part of answering the question of how the activist actions of 
creating these works mediate between the boundary of art and activism by using strategies of 
representation recognized as being those of nations. It is in these public spaces where the community 
not only comes into contact with these works, but also takes part in the process of recognizing them as 
part of a potential ‘nation’.  
 
 
1.1 Cultural ‘othering’ through monuments  
 
An initial discussion on the wider region and its use of monuments will allow for a more complete 
understanding of the historical context. The primary area where monuments have been built is in 
Mali’s capital Bamako. Construction of monuments in Mali (predominantly in its capital) started as 
late as 1995 because history had previously been described primarily in the traditions of oral and 
performative arts. The Alpha Oumar Konaré government was the first to see a reason for investing in 
public sculpture because it could provide a national narrative.11 The rise of these public monuments is 
documented in Mary Jo Arnoldi’s two essays ‘Symbolically Inscribing the City: Public Monuments in 
Mali, 1995-2002’ (2003) and ‘Bamako, Mali: Monuments and Modernity in the Urban Imagination’ 
(2007). The goal of these public works was to create sites for visualizing shared history.12 As will 
become clear in this section, this aim of creating sites for visualizing shared history is repeated in the 
monuments of Northern Mali. 
The ‘Independence Monument’ in Bamako (Figure 2) takes it shape from mud brick mosques 
in Northern Mali (Figure 4). This connection to Northern Mali, the territory claimed by the MNLA, 
means this monument is a good comparison to those in the North. The most prominent style of 
monuments in Bamako is social realism. Social realism aims to draw attention to the struggles of the 
working class and call to question those in power.13 Clearly, the independence monument does not 
follow this style. Instead it presents itself as a more stylized version of the mosques. While there is no 
confirmed reason for this change, we could attribute it to the vocal protest of Islamic groups who 
argue that the images in social realism violate Islamic law.14 The design of this monument is similar 
to one in the MNLA territory, shown in Figure 3. The creator of the monument shown on Figure 3 
before its appropriation is not known, nor is there, as far as this research has been able to find, any 
																																																								
11 Arnoldi 2003, 56. 
12 Arnoldi 2007, 3-4. 
13 Arnoldi 2003, 56-58. 
14 Ibid, 65. 
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record of when it was built but we do know it is located in Kidal, Northern Mali.15 It is possible to see 
the resemblances in the design of the two monuments in Figures 2 and 3; we can conclude that both 
take their shapes from the Northern mosques (Figure 4). By the time Moussa Ag Assarid took this 
photo in 2014, Mazou Ibrahim Touré painted it in the colors of the Azawad flag, red, green, yellow, 
and black. An example of the flag on a flat surface can be seen in Figure 10. Although the original 
purpose of the monument is unknown, Touré re-purposes it without violating Islamic interdiction 
(vital since the Northern region of Mali has a large Muslim community.16 Touré uses the shape of the 
monument to paint parts of it in the colours of the Azawad flag; this is enough to evoke its symbolic 
meaning. The flag is the sole symbol on this monument. There is no addition of figures but a large 
part of the Arabic word for Azawad, داوزأ, can be seen on the inside of the minaret shaped roof. From 
a distance this calligraphy will not be visible, the flag here serves as the primary form of identifying 
what the re-purposed monument is meant to represent. Although the shape of the monuments is quite 
similar, the two are drastically different in terms of colour. The monument in Bamako consists of 
exposed brick, what stands out is its shape—particularly the detailed brickwork at the top—as well as 
its top minaret. The materiality of the monument in Kidal takes a backseat. The colours of the 
Azawad flag stand in stark contrast to the light brown sand that surrounds it. While both are arguably 
nationalist monuments, one does this by fitting into its environment while the other purposefully 
stands out. 
Arnoldi argues in her paper on the monuments in Bamako that it is important not to 
underestimate the capacity for national constructions to influence cultural meaning.17 If the purpose of 
the monument in Kidal is the same as that in Bamako—namely to celebrate independence—then a 
discussion on how the public is influenced by these monuments needs to consider in what way they 
present emancipation from or reiteration of not just political forces but also cultural forces. This 
discussion is based on the concept of the ‘other’ in relation to the ‘self’ as described by John Clark in 
his essay ‘Modernities in Art: How are they “Other”?’. Though Clark’s latter discussion is on 
modernity, the first portion of his essay focuses on defining the other in relation to the self. He argues 
this self is defined as an ‘other than’, two poles categorically connected but seen as in opposition to 
each other.18 This concept is easily defined within the concept of nations: an ‘other’ in nationness is a 
person or group who does not belong to this particular nation. This means that inclusion within a 
nation requires the exclusion of what it is not. However, minorities attempting to become emancipated 
blur these lines slightly by arguing that their oppressors are the ‘other’, showing that there can be 
binary opposition within officially recognised nations. Homi Bhabha in The Location of Culture 
(1994) argues that the nation is temporal, meaning that within this context at least, the classification of 																																																								
15 Staal 2014c, 9. 
16 Arnoldi 2003, 65. 
17 Arnoldi 2007, 82. 
18 Clark 2008, 401-405. 
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‘other’ becomes temporal too.19 If the ‘self’ is defined broadly, as it is in the proposed multicultural 
state of Azawad, the common denominator becomes increasingly common, meaning, the ‘self’ 
becomes defined as wide as is the imagined community necessitates. In practical terms: all visual 
symbols are derived from the flag, its colours, and the names for the nation (Azawad) and the name of 
the movement (MNLA).  
The monuments shown in Figures 2 and 3 fulfil the same purpose; both are attempts to create 
a visual record of a shared history. The difference however is that the monument in Bamako was 
created as a national monument whereas the monument in Kidal was re-appropriated to become a 
monument. This change clearly shows the temporality of the ‘other’: “Old monuments and symbols of 
the former French state and current Malian state are painted in the national colours of Azawad”.20 We 
can only take Touré word here that he has done so. The one example might be Figure 3, but since we 
don’t have an example of what it looked like before it was painted it is impossible to know. If we 
assume Touré to be speaking the truth, it means he engages in an erasure of the former state, an 
erasure of the former ‘self’. Distinctive here in this quote from Touré is his use of the word ‘state’. 
The state refers to a government of a territory or country while a nation is formed by the common 
experience (historical, cultural, linguistic) of a group of people.21 It is not necessary for there to be a 
nation if there is a state. A state that has a singular nation is referred to as a nation-state. A state can 
also exist of multiple nations, there are many examples of contemporary multicultural, and therefore 
multinational, states. There is consensus of these terms within political science.22 Therefore, arguing 
that symbols of the French and Malian state are painted over to become nationalist symbols reveals 
an important distinction; it allows for this discussion to occur on a cultural level as opposed to a 
political one. Additionally, if the monument shown in Figure 3 was a state symbol covered by a 
nationalist symbol this shows why the initial monument was easy to cover up, it didn’t hold cultural, 
national, value.  
 
 
1.2 Murals: appropriating existing spaces  
 
The entrances of towns and cities are inscribed with slogans and paintings referring to Azawad as 
shown in Figures 5 and 6. While the first image shows a painting by Mazou Ibrahim Touré—the same 
person who painted the monument shown in Figure 3—the second wall drawing consists of text and is 
not attributed to a specific person. Many of these wall drawings consist only of text, but can be 
considered murals if we define the term murals as wall drawings which depict social justice 
																																																								
19 Bhabha 1994, 142. 
20 Staal 2014. 
21 Oxford English Dictionary. 
22 Rejai, Enloe, 1969. 
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struggles.23 Touré however has opted to, instead of using text, create a ‘peace sign’ in the colours of 
the Azawad flag on the front of a building that helps local women (Figure 5). These murals form part 
of the community and therefore part of a shared history. While the murals enforce the ideology of 
‘Azawad’ in the same way that the public sculpture in Figure 3 does, the difference here is that they 
are placed at thoroughfares, most likely seen by more, but observed for a shorter amount of time. The 
simplistic message of the murals then becomes clear; they must be able to be understood in a quick 
glance.  
 The murals serve a purpose for both local inhabitants and the international media. Touré 
describes this in a 2014 interview with Jonas Staal: 
You have seen all the painted flags on the walls in the city, right? The MNLA realized 
that the whole world was going to come to see us. So what were we to do, to make clear 
to the world that we exist? What is the first image journalists and politicians see when 
they arrive at the airport? One day I had the luck of running into a media team of France 
24. I passed them while they were shooting an item, and I heard a reporter say: ‘We are 
here today in Kidal, and the very first thing we see upon arrival is the flag of Azawad’24 
Touré clarifies that the prime aim of these murals is to give an immediate impression of the character 
of the place, particularly to outsiders. The works, as seen in Figures 5 and 6, are simplistic; they allow 
for different encounters but also proclaim a dimension of emancipation. In his essay ‘Beyond 
Emancipation’ (1996), Ernesto Laclau argues that emancipation has six dimensions. This essay was 
written in the 1990s after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and argues that at that point Europe was 
witnessing the dis-integration of emancipation. Laclau argues emancipation is not the creation of 
something new but the liberation of something that already existed. His six dimensions are: 
dichotomic, holistic, transparency, pre-existence of what has to be emancipated, dimension of ground, 
and lastly, the rationalistic dimension. He argues that these do not form a unified whole but adds that 
this does not mean they cannot be helpful in discussions on emancipation.25 By transparency Laclau 
refers to the removal of barriers to connect the public to the political, religious, and so on. He argues 
that transparency exists side by side with opaqueness since that is the distinction between what is part 
of the nation and what is not.26 The murals in this chapter can function within Laclau’s emancipatory 
dimension of transparency, because it is trying to preclude opaqueness. The aim of the work, as has 
become clear from Touré’s interview is to de-alienate the idea of Azawad—the thought of Azawad is 
brought into the realm of the real, as in the extension and occupation of space. It should be noted that 
Laclau argues transparency on one hand can make other parts opaque; in the case of Azawad the 
murals unite the smaller groups into a larger collective ignoring their intergroup differences.  
																																																								
23 Murray 2016, 45. 
24 Touré in Staal 2014a, 94. 
25 Laclau 1996, 1-2. 
26 Ibid, 6. 
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There is a further duality here. The murals allow for both inclusion and exclusion—they 
clarify the identity of the space the traveller is about to enter (or exit). In Relational Aesthetics Nicolas 
Bourriaud describes a type of art created in the realm of interactions in the social. Bourriaud focuses 
his discussion on art created in Europe in the 1990s but his reason for arguing that these are relational 
is increasing urbanisation.27 As said previously in the introduction, the Kel Tamasheq are increasingly 
moving away from their nomadic lifestyle, settling instead in small towns. While this is not the 
dramatic urbanisation Bourriaud describes, it is an increasing trend towards it, meaning relational 
aesthetics can be useful for disseminating the murals created in these relatively new social spaces.  
Bourriaud refers to duality as the degree of randomness and argues “It can be a machine for 
provoking and managing individual or collective encounters”.28 Although a work of relational 
aesthetics allows for a social exchange there remains a distinction between those living in and outside 
of where these murals are located. The works, by being placed in these specific areas of town, create 
an ‘other’, meaning that the artists are creating new collective encounters in what becomes ‘us’ when 
the rest of the country is the ‘other’.  
If a visual work is capable of producing these states of encounter how it does this—both 
symbolically and aesthetically—should be considered since both function together to create this ‘us 
and them’ divide. Karl Marx described the term interstice to describe a space that allows for 
discussions outside of the normal system. Bourriaud argues contemporary art exhibitions are one 
example of the interstice because they “encourage an inter-human intercourse which is different to the 
‘zones of communication’ that are forced upon us”.29 Social interactions that take place in the 
interstice can potentially exist within the fabric of everyday life, but provide a type of exchange that is 
impossible in the rest of the system of interactions. Bourriaud argues that exhibitions occupy both a 
space within the interactions related to trade but also provide a space for something else, a different 
type of communication.30 The murals in Azawad fit within the overall system of interactions because 
they occupy a space that the public already inhabits but provides a different type of interaction with 
the environment than if they did not exist. Bourriaud continues, arguing that it is the responsibility of 
the artist within this interstice to know how their works function within the social interactions outside 
of the interstice. The point is that this interaction must take place in two directions; the artist can take 
inspiration from the larger system but must also insert itself back into it.31 The only artist who is 
named as the creator of some of these murals is Touré. The mural by Touré shown in Figure 5 draws 
on two representations. Firstly, in the form of the color of the mural: the colors of the flag of Azawad 
are black, red, green, and yellow.  Secondly, in the use of the ‘Peace sign’ or ‘V sign’, in 
contemporary society a widely used symbol—capable of being read by both the local and outsider 																																																								
27 Bourriaud in Bishop 2006a, 160. 
28 Bourriaud in Bishop 2006a, 163. 
29 Ibid, 161. 
30 Ibid, 161. 
31 Ibid, 162. 
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communities. This mural, because of its use of symbolic as opposed to written language, much like 
other murals depicting solely the Azawad flag, becomes more effective than the written murals 
(Figure 6)—its reach can be further since the symbols (the flag and ‘peace sign’) are recognized.  
These murals—particularly those created by Touré—function as an example of works that 
draw on activism. There is a clear political meaning in both the textual and non-textual works but the 
non-textual works make no demands of the passerby. By not adding text to certain murals we can 
speak of the aesthetic experience allowing viewers to take part in the inter-human relations for which 
there would otherwise be no space and which are restricted when, as is the case in Figure 6, the wall 
bears solely a slogan which needs no additional interpretation by the viewer. The use of symbols 
instead of text makes the idea translatable, it makes it possible to convey the idea to a different 
audience, one that might be more familiar with the use of the peace sign and the flag than the term 
MNLA. The use of the flag as a signifying symbol is discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. 
 
 
1.3 Performative monuments: community-driven public visualisation 
 
While the previous two sections have discussed public artworks and their relationship with a 
relatively passive public, this section will focus on visual works made by the public instead of for the 
public. It is important to consider the ways in which publics interact with the works; the visual 
representation of shared history can be a collective process or, as described in the previous two 
sections, a process of works created by singular individuals. This visualisation for collective memory 
is also present in the monuments created in Bamako, they were meant to address a “crisis in 
memory”, aimed at engaging the youth not just to observe the monuments, but to interact with them 
and forge these collective memories.32 This shared struggle is vital in the depiction of Mali, Arnoldi 
argues it continues until this day and “has been one of the most important and persistent themes to 
emerge in Mali’s nationalist rhetoric”.33 Consider this shared struggle in connection with relational 
aesthetics. Relational aesthetics means art based on human relations as opposed to object-based space 
relations. This means it becomes possible to see the work created in Azawad as an example of this 
mode of making. Just as in the previous section, we can look at these works using Bourriaud’s theory 
of relational aesthetics. To illustrate this, consider Figure 7 and its attached description,  
A very important place, the Square of the Freedom of the Azawadian People, where children, 
youth, and women gather to place flags and plants, the latter commemorating martyrs, with 
each plant bearing the name of a lost one. The surviving families take care of the plants in 
																																																								
32 Arnoldi 2007, 11. 
33 Ibid. 
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order to keep in memory the sacrifice of martyrs and their contribution to the ongoing struggle 
of the Azawadian people.34  
This project can function as a work of relational aesthetics because it is based on the creation of 
human relations. Instead of being created by an individual, the group project does away with the idea 
that the artwork is autonomous; links are generated, creating a relational space. There are two 
outcomes of the participation in a work of relation aesthetics according to Claire Bishop, “One is 
disruptive and interventionist, the other constructive and ameliorative”.35 She argues these forms are 
separate, but it can be argued that Figure 7 shows both; it is disruptive towards the Malian state but 
constructive because it tries to add the deaths that are marked by the monument into collective 
memory. One of Claire Bishop’s criticisms of relational aesthetics is that by emphasizing the “active 
subject being formed via participation in an artwork, […] the matter of power is overlooked” and “the 
restoration of a social bond is imagined through participatory art projects”.36 Additionally, Bishop 
criticizes Bourriaud for undermining critical debate by favouring communal activities37 but in the case 
of the communal artwork on ‘The Square of the Freedom of the Azawadian People’, both a critical 
debate and a communal activity can be seen to occur. There is communality in the work because of its 
nature as essentially a communal park in which the surrounding inhabitants take care of the plants. At 
the same time the work can be argued to be a critique because of its status as a work showing struggle 
and martyrdom. The work is therefore not convivial in its encounter with the ‘other’ (the ‘other’ here 
being those Malian citizens in favour of the government in Bamako); instead this is where the critique 
appears.  
 We can argue here, just as in the previous section, that shown in Figure 7 is an example of the 
dimension of transparency. Again, transparency focuses on the removal of the alienation between 
aspects of cultural and political life, bringing them to the foreground and allowing a larger public to 
participate. However, this means that the nation is a closed system, since bordering the transparency is 
opaqueness. The reduction of the alienation between the subject and object is achieved because the 
subjects (the surviving families) are taking part in the creation of the object (the plants and flags). The 
square is a visual representation of the men the families have lost. The addition of the flag, as was 
shown in the previous sections, adds to the recognisability of the work for outsiders. However, we can 
argue that the participatory element in this work creates active subjects of the families and those 
living near the Square. This stands in contrast to the gathering shown in Figure 8. The demonstrators 
stand in a line holding a banner which is not legible in the photograph, but which we do know was 
made by Touré. Instead of participating in the creation of a visual work as is the case in the Square, 
the demonstrators appear to be no more than a wall—there to hold the banner. 
																																																								
34 Assarid in Staal 2014a, 170. 
35 Bishop 2006b, 180. 
36 Bishop in Hewitt and Jordan 2016, 32. 
37 Hewitt and Jordan 2016, 32. 
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While the presence of the Azawad flag still functions as a symbol in the same way as 
discussed with the murals, it lacks participation by those in the photograph—participation either in the 
way of creating the banner or in the way of actively taking part in the dissemination of the 
information on the banner. It could be argued that in reality the public experience of the 
demonstration was different. However, in this photograph the crowd has been reduced to a backdrop; 
Figure 8 is meant as an example of how the MNLA empowers the youth and women of the 
movement, according to its accompanying caption. Compared with the ‘Square of the Freedom of the 
Azawadian people’ (Figure 7), Figure 8 displays a form of activism, not as a participatory artwork 
largely because of the difference in effort that the participants have put in. Bourriaud’s emphasis on 
enforcing that the public plays a large role in understanding the work (and perhaps even in creating it) 
means we can argue that Figure 7 shows a type of relational artwork and Figure 8 does not.  
 
 
1.4 The border as a public monument  
 
As mentioned before, the Oxford English Dictionary defines a monument as a “structure or site of 
historical importance”38 and it is clear from the previous examples that a monument must bear some 
marks of its cultural significance, either in imagery or text. The border, defined by its markers serves 
this purpose. This can only be the case with disputed borders, since they take on a cultural 
significance. We can therefore consider the border between Azwadian Mali and non Azawadian Mali 
to be a monument. Figure 9 shows the desert border between Mali and proposed Awawad. Unlike in 
other regions where there is conflict on the legitimacy of the state there is no wall separating Azawad 
and Mali; the sole indicators are the flags placed along the border by unknown individuals and at 
checkpoints. Within the context of the culture of a nation the creation of this border is important; it is 
a physical representation of what is deemed to be a national and therefore cultural border.   
 The flags are there to inform the public on both sides of the conflict that they are entering a 
different space. The flags create this space because there would otherwise be no difference. Without 
the indication of the border the visitor would simply be standing in the desert. This clarifies that what 
this indication does is create a difference where there would otherwise not be one. The symbol of the 
Azawad flag has made one side of the photograph of the desert different from the other. This means 
that while this is not an official border, it behaves like one because of the creation of this difference. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the creation of an ‘other’ occurs within a specific category, the 
‘other’ here is created through a simple placing of a flag, determining that one side is not like the 
other, although categorically speaking they are the same desert. One legitimate question is whether 
someone unfamiliar with the region would recognize the flag as demarcating a border. The caption of 																																																								
38 Oxford English Dictionary. 
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Figure 9 makes clear that it is, so no viewer of the document of the border would be mistaken. 
Additionally, one could argue that a visitor to the location of the real flag would be aware of the 
regional conflict. There is a similarity here with the murals discussed in this chapter; the murals are 
also often placed at entrances to indicate either the relationship the individuals in the town have with 
the official state or that the visitor is moving from one space into another. As with the murals using 
symbols instead of text, ‘foreignness’ is avoided by using a symbol as opposed to a text. The result of 
this is that one already has the symbolic language to read the image, even if one does not know whose 
flag it is; the concept of the flag and its relation to nationalist sympathies is a phenomenon known to 
most in contemporary society. It remains a mystery what is on the other side of the flag; one would 
assume if this were a regular border the Malian flag would occupy the other side of the sign. The 
caption and documentation is unclear so we cannot assume that this is the case, adding the issue that 
perhaps the Azawad flag appears on both sides. This would obviously complicate the matter of 
knowing on which side of the border you are standing. 
This image of the border shows that the strength lies in knowing that this is a border, knowing 
the political and activist context. Knowing this demarcates a border alters the meaning of the sand in 
front of and behind the flag. This means that while a visual work is capable of showing that there is 
some sort of opposition between the two sides, it is with the addition of activism that this flag 
becomes a monument of Azawad. The proposed border shows the temporality of what is ‘other’ while 
at the same time showing that this temporality is capable of being manipulated by groups through this 
kind of visual activism.  Using the reasoning from the previous section, this border monument is not a 
work of relational aesthetics. The demarcation of the border exists whether there is a public there to 
see it or not. While the public could play a role in legitimizing the actual border element, the audience 
doesn’t play a role in its visual manifestation.  
 
In two papers on stateless democracies (including Azawad) entitled ‘To Make a World’ part one and 
part two, Jonas Staal argues stateless internationalism is not restricted to national borders.39 Staal 
brought the story of Azawad to the outside world; his influence on the project’s dissemination abroad 
is discussed at length in the third chapter of this thesis. This generalisation is unhelpful in relation to 
Azawad since this does not mean that contemporary nationalist cultural struggles are not partly 
determined by their visual presence on the border. Staal argues current states don’t care about their 
borders anymore.40 This is clearly not true in a proposed country such as Azawad. We can conclude 
here that if the border is undisputed the position of the ‘self’ in relation to the ‘other’ is not 
questioned.  
 
																																																								
39 Staal 2014b, 5. 
40 Staal 2014c, 3. 
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What this chapter has shown is that the monuments function as a way to create an ‘other’. Monuments 
help in the creation of a distinction within the category of nationalism and allow for an area to make 
clear their nationalist loyalties. The risk of illegibility is avoided because of use of signs, the most 
obvious one being the flag, which, once known by the user, makes it difficult to ‘unsee’ in these 
monuments, murals and borders. 
The centralized locations of these monuments have shown to make them particularly 
effective.  The squares and thoroughfares provide places for acknowledging the shared struggles of 
the Azawadian people as well as enforcing the Azawadian ideology of a multi-ethnic nation. The 
problem here is obvious, it becomes difficult to see what functions because of the people and which 
artworks function as propaganda, forced into public memory. This chapter cannot answer that 
question, it can only be determined that the element of propaganda is limited by the inclusion of the 
public in the creation of the works. If anything, what has been shown is that it is difficult to determine 
where the boundary between art and activism lies. With the inclusion of relational aesthetics an 
attempt has been made to see activism and public engagement as part of a visual strategy. 
Chapter two takes a more detailed look at the use of the flag in these visualisations and the 
symbolic meaning of it. As we continue, this chapter, showing where the works are located and the 
public’s role (or lack thereof) in their creation, remains vital in considering how these works function 
with the marginalized space.  
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Chapter 2: The flag as nation ritual 
 
Many—if not most—of the figures shown in the previous chapter contain a depiction of the flag of 
Azawad. A discussion on the role of this flag is warranted because of its broad use as the symbol of 
the nation of Azawad. The flag, as shown in Figure 10, consists of four colors, each with their 
assigned symbolic meaning as described by one of the leaders of the movement, Moussa Ag Assarid. 
He states that the black stands for the years of suffering under the Mali regime. Red is to honor the 
martyrs. Green stands for hope, vegetation and rain. Lastly, yellow describes the earth of Azawad—
the color of the Sahara desert.41 Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities (2006) writes that 
nationality consists of multiple cultural artifacts. The flag, widely used as a sign for Azawad, can be 
seen as the nation’s most widespread artifact.42 Symbols such as flags are seen as obsolete by theorists 
such as Anthony Smith who argues in ‘Nations in Decline?’ (2007) that it is only in the elderly where 
a flag demands loyalty and respect since a younger generation is “impatient of the paraphernalia of an 
outdated nationalism”.43 A glance at those involved in the demonstrations for Azawad (Figure 8) 
shows that Smith’s statement does not ring true in Northern Mali. Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism 
(1995) describes how many believe that the nation in the postmodern is in decline44 but the mere 
existence of the movement in Azawad would deem this statement to be false. Benedict Anderson 
would agree here, he argues nationalism remains the most powerful legitimizing political force.45 
Since the flag is the most widely used symbol of Azawad, its role in the various visual interventions 
needs to be determined. 
The previous chapter discussed signs at the entrance of cities and villages. Some of these 
signs included versions of the flag of Azawad. Flags have historically fulfilled two major functions. 
Until the eighteenth century, they served a pragmatic purpose for the problems in non-verbal 
identification. More recently flags have had a symbolic purpose. The distinction Billig makes is 
between ‘waved’ and ‘unwaved’ flags. A ‘waved’ flag describes a flag that communicates a distinct 
message and forms part of a ritual or specific emotion. An ‘unwaved’ flag is largely ignored; it is a 
symbol but is not paid much attention to.46 The difference between these two types of flag 
presentation can be seen on Remembrance days. The flags used in the parade to stand around and 
salute are ‘waved’. The half-mast flags on buildings remain ‘unwaved’. This is because while one 
may see them, they serve as a background to the flags used in the remembrance ceremonies. Billig 
argues it can be predicted that as a nation is under less pressure to declare its sovereignty the amount 
that a flag is ‘waved’ is reduced. While an initial aim might be to wave the flag from the roof of every 																																																								
41 Staal 2014d. 
42 Anderson 2006, 4. 
43 Smith 2007, 22. 
44 Billig 1995, 128. 
45 Anderson 2006, 3. 
46 Billig 1995, 39. 
Amelie de Haan 
s11989855 
 22 
building, this is done in an effort to eventually have to the citizens no longer take much notice of 
them; people would be living their regular daily lives47. 
In the case of Azawad, flags are used as a form of identification at entrances (see Figure 10) 
since it is clear about its intention—the flag here is ‘waved’, meaning its purpose is to be seen and, 
while perhaps not saluted, it does serve a signaling function. It serves the function of declaring the 
nation to those entering the town and the national loyalties that the flag entails. It becomes possible to 
argue here that all flags in unstable nations serve a signaling function since they exist within 
competing states. This is also true of the flag on an individual’s clothes in Figure 11.  
The discussion in this chapter focuses on the symbolic function of flags as opposed to the 
signaling function. Part of the strategy of this chapter comes from ‘The War of the Flags: Conflicting 
national loyalties in a modern colonial situation’ (2006), a paper written by Juan Manuel Carrión. In 
this case, Puerto Rico serves as Carrión’s case study, providing an overview of a twenty-first century 
national conflict. The paper is useful for its discussion on the flag as symbol and the notion of banal 
or hot nationalism. However, since it is a sociological paper, it fails to give adequate attention to the 
visual forms in which the flag is used. While sociology can explain the activist role in the creation of 
these interventions, visual research is how the flag can be brought into an art historical context.  
There are four sections in this chapter. The first section gives an in depth argument for how 
both the materiality of the flag and its context are responsible for the creation of symbolic meaning. 
The second part discusses the relationship between depictions of the flag alongside written language 
in specific relation to the flags shown in the figures in the thesis. While there are many cases in which 
the flag appears on its own, the use of both the Azawad flag and written language provides room for a 
discussion on the liminality of these two forms and proceeds to argue that this space is also where the 
boundary between art and activism is located. The third section follows on from the discussion of 
language to introduce the concept of translation—since the depictions of the flags are made by 
different individuals it is possible to argue that the flags are all different versions—translations—of 
each other. The final section argues that whereas the self created through ‘othering’ is one that falls 
into the older style of nationalist selfs, the widespread use of the flag creates a form of state fetishism, 
reducing the identity of Azawad to be able to encompass the different groups.  
 
 
2.1 The flag as Symbol 
 
There are several factors that would determine that a flag is a key symbol for a group. Sherry B. 
Ortner in ‘On Key Symbols’ (1973) describes these indicators as: high importance to the local 
population, it must awaken certain emotions (locals cannot be indifferent to it), it appears in varying 																																																								
47 Billig 1995, 41. 
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contexts, it is surrounded by cultural collaboration and there are restrictions in its use.48 The first 
chapter showed the varying uses of the flag by locals and the collaborative processes in which the flag 
is used. What did not become evident from that chapters were any restrictions in the use of the flag; if 
anything, the wide variety of uses shown in both the first chapter and in this second chapter clarify 
that the flag is not restricted in its use because it is shown to be used informally.  
Ortner continues describing key symbols as being on a line between summarizing and 
elaborating. Summarizing symbols require an emotional response and summarize meaning. One 
example given by Ortner is the American flag, which stand for “the American way”.49 Alternatively, 
an elaborating symbol occurs often, is not sacred, and serves as a starting point for the creation of 
meaning. Another author who describes the use of the American flag is Michael Billig by referring to 
it as a representation of banal nationalism; which concludes that flags that are not physically waved 
and given direct attention indicate that a nation’s existence is not under threat. While Ortner describes 
the function of the American flag as being one of summarizing, the propagation of banal nationalism 
means the flag has travelled far and wide and is used in both a way to symbolize the American way 
(as discussed by Ortner and Billig) but also as a way to disseminate the meaning of the symbol, 
particularly in latter half of the twentieth century. One well-known example of this is Jasper Johns’s 
painting ‘Flag’ (1954-55) which embodied a “radical erasure and denial” of American nationalism by 
removing the emotional aspect and approaching the flag instead with indifference.50 We can consider 
this indifference one form of banal nationalism—the difference with Johns’s painting is that it very 
obviously points the viewer to the symbol, unlike unwaved flags which remain in the background. 
‘Flag’ therefore shows that it is possible for a symbol like a flag to be on show while not being fully 
clear on its intentions. The wearing of a piece of clothing with a particular flag on it would make one 
assume that there is an affiliation with that particular nation. However, the use of the American flag 
turns this concept on its head; there are many who wear the flag without being American and there are 
many Americans using the American flag in forms that are not directly related to nation-ness. The 
uses of the flag in decorative items of clothing, or as shown in Figure 11 in the form of bunting, are 
forms of banal nationalism. This is because, unless specifically pointed out, they remain unnoticed. 
Nationalist symbols are noticed when they present challenges to the present order but are always 
present, they are not excluded from ordinary life. 51  
Juan Manuel Carrión describes flags as being part of the ritual of a nation, regardless of 
whether the flag is waved or unwaved, they are part of the process of legitimization. He describes that 
rituals “serve not only to reflect power but also to make it possible”.52 Since Azawad is attempting to 
both legitimize its cause and gain the power to self-govern, it is when the flag is seen as part of a 																																																								
48 Ortner 1973, 1339. 
49 Ibid, 1339-1340. 
50 Roth 1977, 50. 
51 Carrión 2006, 105. 
52 Ibid, 103. 
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ritual that the space between visual intervention and activism becomes clear. By wearing these 
symbols on their clothes and displaying them in their environment, the nation of Azawad becomes 
visible. It should be noted that the Azawad flag is not greatly different than the flag of Mali. The 
Malian flag consists of three colors: green, yellow, and red. This means the Azawadian flag adds only 
one other color and horizontal stripes instead of the Malian vertical stripes. The argument could be 
made that this is close enough to the current flag to be familiar yet different enough for the public to 
know that they are not the same.  
 
When the public doesn’t have physical power, it turns to ritual power. A colonial force aims to 
prevent rites because they provide “common identification and communication”.53 This is one reason 
why using visual interventions in combination with the MNLA flag can be seen as a successful way 
of building an imagined community; the flag stands for the idea of the nation. The focus here is on 
how individuals within the group function as creators of this nationalist narrative.  
Within the context of relational aesthetics, which focuses on social interactions within a 
public environment, the use of the flag by a large group of people and the appropriation of that flag 
means that these collective encounters involve the active participation of the public. Claire Bishop’s 
earlier critique of the problem of power in works of relational aesthetics is dealt with here by the 
public’s creation of their own works that concurrently exist within a group of multiple ‘works’. This 
means that instead of power being brought into a singular collective object such as the square of 
martyrs discussed in the previous chapter (Figure 7), the power within the work is fragmented 
between the participants. Whereas banners in place of people (Figure 8) can’t be considered to be 
relational art because of the lack of agency shown, when an individual decorates themselves with the 
flag, we can consider them to be works of relational aesthetics. This is because the person wearing the 
piece of clothing has the ability to interact with those around them, respond to the interactions, and be 
altered by the possible suggestions or group dynamic of those around them.  
The ritual use of flags relates to the different uses of the flags in banal and hot nationalism. 
Billig coined the term banal nationalism to differentiate it from more extreme forms of nationalism. 
Banal nationalism is more subliminal—it almost appears invisible54. The look of the flag-bearing 
clothing can appear as an example of banal nationalism—showing similarities with the wearing of 
versions of the flag in the United States of America—the act of wearing it as a protest brings with it 
the idea of the nation55 and at the same time reduces its sacred value because it is not displayed 
according to the many rules. However, the distinction is that the United States of America is not seen 
as a nation under threat. It is the possibility of threat that turns a shirt with the same flag into an item 
of hot nationalism.  																																																								
53 Kertzer 1988, 168-169. 
54 Billig 1995, 128. 
55 Carrión 2006, 104. 
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Tom Holert in ‘National Heterologies’ (2014) refers to the flag as the totem-emblem, both a 
sacred object that must be protected and imbued in everyday life—it could be argued that this is the 
case in nations where hot nationalism is present and nations of banal nationalism. The materiality of 
the flag is important in its ritual value. While Holert describes a tattered French flag as being 
symbolic of a worn out state56, in the case of the homemade clothing (Figure 11) the worn out state of 
the flag shows it is handmade; again referring to the agency of the individual who made it and thereby 
imbuing the wearer with this same agency. This argument is true also for the handmade flags in other 
photographs,57 but does not apply to the worn out flags shown in Figure 12. The reason for this is that 
the context of the flag matters58; bunting (the hanging flags shown in Figure 12) is a form of banal 
nationalism—they do not demand attention, these are ‘unwaved’ flags.59 Although comparisons with 
other states are helpful, in the case of Azawad—an unstable nation—both waved and unwaved flags 
exist within an environment of hot nationalism. Hot nationalism exists when the existence of a 
country is under question. If we consider that new nation-states, in the process of legitimizing 
themselves, borrow the form of the old,60 the reason for the use of classic forms of banal nationalism 
becomes clearer. What constitutes as banal nationalism in stable countries becomes—waved or 
unwaved—a form of hot nationalism in the context of Azawad. Meaning the way in which power is 
dispersed is different because the form in which the flags are displayed is ritualized regardless of its 
context since no matter how it appears it will be seen as a way of challenging the legitimacy of the 
current nation. 
 
 
2.2 Text and images 
 
There are several examples of the use of text in combination with depictions of the Azawad flag. In 
Figure 8 a group of men, women and youths hold a cloth banner that bears a pattern of text-flag-text- 
flag-text. The inclusion of text in-between the images discussed previously adds another dimension to 
the audience’s perception of the work. While language can connect those within singular language 
groups, it separates those from different language groups by fostering a divided instead of mutual 
experience. Nationalism is not equal to ethnic grouping but neither should the difference of language 
be seen as pre-determined; it is temporary and subject to change. The addition of written text changes 
the flags because it adds additional context and direction. This means that while symbols such as the 
flag represent an imagined community, the verbal discussion on the symbols is what forms the 
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community. The question here is how the use of text influences depictions of the Azawad flag when 
the two are combined in a single image. 
The area claimed by the MNLA does not fall within a singular language region, meaning 
using a singular language would exclude some who live in the area, disallowing them from being part 
of the imagined community. The solution is then not to settle on a singular written language, but 
instead to settle for a singular visual language, elaborated on in multiple written languages. The first 
example of this technique can be seen in the previous chapter—Figure 8—where a group of 
demonstrators is holding a banner. While the exact words on the banner are illegible because of the 
quality of the photograph, what is clear is the attempt to combine three languages and, separating the 
slogans, the Azawad flag. What becomes the encompassing symbol for the group is the flag, since 
that is what all participants are capable of reading. The slogans therefore provide additional context 
with the flag, perhaps making it easier to understand what the flag stand for, but it is the flag that, as a 
symbol, remains at the core of this intervention. The presence of visual symbols therefore alters the 
problem of linguistic conflicting claims because it is both a collective symbol and it gives direction to 
the different domains which might appear when using multiple languages. 
Chapter one determined that the performance in Figure 8 is not a form of relational aesthetics. 
While a flag on its own does not carry an ‘informational message’, the way in which a flag is 
displayed can be a signal.61 The quality of the photograph doesn’t provide enough detail to read the 
text on the banner so instead we can look at Figure 7 which depicts a flag with a text superimposed on 
it which reads: “Place de la liberté du peuple de l’Azawad” (The square of the Freedom of the 
Azawadian People) in three different languages. Homi Bhabha describes the interstice as “the overlap 
and displacement of domains of difference”.62 Image and text are arguably two different domains but 
both are able to give legitimacy to an argument, meaning that they come together in this interstice. 
This is why the ritual aspects of text and image are what determine power. The symbolic meaning of 
the inclusion of all three languages superimposed on the flag is one of unity. This unity only exists 
when all languages are present or when all languages are absent. This stand in contrast to the use of 
the flag which, without the text, is capable of identifying that same ‘self’. 
 
2.3 Translation  
 
In the first chapter a discussion was started on the use of multi-culturally recognised symbols. When 
we see the flag as another one of those symbols it opens up a discussion on how key symbols are 
translated into national ideologies and sympathies. If translation can take place from a visual symbol 
to an ideology, and not just in written language it becomes possible to focus a discussion on how 
symbols are effective because they cannot be reduced to a single specific meaning; as section 2.2 																																																								
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shows, symbols are dependent on context. Homi Bhabha discusses translation in relation to 
transnational dissemination in his book Location of Culture (1994). Transnational dissemination 
occurs, as the name suggests, on the periphery. Within Azawad we can speak of intranational 
dissemination instead because of the multiple language groups that occupy the territory. If we 
consider translation to be the way in which cultural communication manifests itself, the effect of this 
translation is a reduction in concentrated power; power becomes more evenly distributed between the 
larger group instead of being in the hands of the few.63 ‘National memory’ is described by Bhabha as 
the place where histories amalgamate and the “displacement of narratives” occurs.64 If the versions of 
the flags made by the public are translations of this national memory, these translations are located in 
the interstice. The interstice, as explained in the first chapter is a space where discussions outside of 
the current system can take place. Additionally, it is in the interstice that visual interventions and 
activism come together to form these separate spaces. These spaces, as shown in the first chapter, are 
not on the boundary of the nation but instead at the very heart of it. Translation, because it describes 
the system of going from one language to another forms the basis of this interstice.  
The versions of the flag are not appropriations since their ritual meaning remains the same; 
this is why they are translations. Walter Benjamin describes this as “instead of resembling the 
meaning of the original, [a translation] must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original's mode of 
signification” and continues to make a point of why this is important, “both the original and the 
translation [are] recognizable as fragments of a greater language.”65 The flags made by multiple 
individuals allow for national memory to exist as multiple narratives. Each flag is one person’s own 
translation of a translation of a translation. With the amount of handmade flags, it is clear that an 
original, if there was one, was most likely not made in the way flags of recognized states are: factory 
produced. We can consider the original of the Azawad flag to be a generally accepted design of the 
basic flag but the material and surrounding design can be down to personal taste. In Figure 5 this can 
be seen because of the addition of the peace sign. Touré has taken the flag and its signification, that of 
a free and peaceful Azawad, and translated this into a work that is similar but not the same. 
If part of the ritual of the flag has become the translation of it into different forms by the 
public, this shows that the solidarity of the group exists within the underlying symbolic meaning of 
the flag (the aim for an independent Azawad) while there is no specific consensus on how the flag 
should be presented. This is different than the ritual use of flags in other nations where the flag is 
sacred—a sacred flag cannot be translated.  
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2.4 The self and the flag  
 
Michael Billig argues that contemporary nationalism, through creating ‘hot’ nationalism, actually 
increases the speed at which nations lose their ground. This is because ‘hot’ nationalism increases the 
instability of their nationhood, making it more likely that the ruling state will intervene.66 
Nationalism, however, continues to persist in postmodernism67. Billig describes the authoritarian self 
and the decentred postmodern self as a description of old and new phenomena respectively. He argues 
there are five differences between the two. The first difference is that authoritarians need hierarchy 
whereas the postmodern is concerned with liminality. In the case of the Azawad flag this presents 
itself as the lack of hierarchy in who is allowed to make and use the flag. Secondly, the psyche of the 
authoritarian is emotional whereas that of the postmodern is playful and detached. This latter 
characteristic cannot be said to be true for the Azawad flags since, although they make use of the 
aesthetics of banal nationalism, they exist within an environment of hot nationalism where the people 
are very much attached to the emotional aspects of the flag.  
The final three descriptions are reliant on the perception of the ‘other’: third, the authoritarian 
sees the world through rigid stereotypes while for the postmodernist cognition is dominant. Fourth, 
the authoritarian sees a single identity, the postmodernist is focused on the continual change of 
identities. Lastly, the authoritarian rejects outside groups while the postmodern person doesn’t abide 
by those boundaries.68 These three points overlap in the postmodern rejection of a simple binary us 
versus them—this is shown in the Azawad interventions through the rejection of using a singular 
written language and opting instead for more universal signs like the flag. What is present is an 
accepting of ‘the people’ with diverse identities whilst remaining loyal to the imagined community of 
Azawad. However, while it is true that there are several languages and ethnic groups living in 
Azawad, the binary us versus them element remains. This is evident in the clear demarcation of the 
border. The reliance on the flag in the visual interventions shows that there remains a strict stereotype 
of what a nation is. These elements show that the two, the authoritarian self and postmodern self, are 
not dichotomously opposed. 
In his essay ‘The Face of the Nation: State Fetishism and Métissage at the Exposition 
Internationale Paris 1937’ (2016) Ihor Junyk describes the chaos France faced in the exposition that 
was meant to represent nations around the world and therefore became idealized versions of every 
country. France, being a multicultural state, focused on stereotyping itself as ‘whole’.69 Junyk 
describes that the use of stereotypically nationalistic rituals and symbols can lead to what is described 
as state fetishism, meaning that the state becomes greater of an entity than its citizens. 70 This concept 																																																								
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is a continuation of Karl Marx’s ‘commodity fetishism’ where reverence is shown for real products 
borne out of abstract aspects. The identity of a fetishized State only exists in fiction, but it can have 
real effects—particularly in relation to the distribution of power.71 This fetishism forms a 
personification of the nation, often through visual interventions to present an ideal national identity.72 
Azawad’s closest fetishist personification is in that of the people wearing flags. However, the wide 
range of the look of the flag as has been shown in this chapter prevents this kind of fetishism from 
happening. This is because the creation of these object lies not with the state but with the people. State 
fetishism is thought to increase the group identity since it can bring a diverse population together with 
a limited number of symbols.73 Again, the limitation of the diversity in which the nation is represented 
can allow for a singular identity broad enough to encompass the whole nation. The concept of state 
fetishism explains why the flag has become the center of the visual side of the movement, however, it 
draws on authoritarian—and therefore pre-postmodern—elements of the self. 
 
An attempt has been made to describe the use of the flag in Azawad and its role in forming group 
identity. The flag, by existing within the context of an unstable nation, is automatically a form of hot 
nationalism. However, the way in which the flag has been used by the public and Touré is akin to 
forms of banal nationalism. The result is that while the public participates in forms of activism, it does 
so with the visual language of an already stable nation. This contrast can exist because this interaction 
happens in the interstice and because of the large number of people that are all adding different forms 
of the flag.  
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Chapter 3: The visual interventions of the MNLA beyond Azawad 
 
The works made by the MNLA have been shown abroad in other countries. This is largely due to 
Jonas Staal’s involvement. Staal, creator of a long-term project titled ‘New World Summit’, brought 
the MNLA and the potential state of Azawad to the foreground with the fourth part in the series: ‘The 
Art of Creating a State: with the National Liberation Movement of Azawad’ in 2012. While the 
previous chapters have looked at visual interventions created by those within the movement and the 
local public, here the aim is to look at how artist Jonas Staal has shaped the interventions during the 
exhibition at Basis Aktuele Kunst (or, BAK, in Utrecht, the Netherlands) and at a later conference 
titled International in Berlin, Germany. The previous chapters have focused on the participants within 
and from Azawad through material primarily sourced by Jonas Staal for inclusion in the New World 
Summit project. The Summit is an organization created for those groups that are currently not 
represented within democratic structures.74 The aim is to create new political spaces with architectural 
installations where political organisations who currently do not have a voice in the political system 
can give talks. One of the events created by Jonas Staal under the banner of the New World Summit 
project was entitled ‘Artist Organisations International’ an organisation whose aim it was to highlight 
twenty long term projects by artist organisations from different parts of the world which explore many 
subject areas including politics.75 Jonas Staal was one of the main organisers alongside two curators, 
Florian Malzacher and Joanna Warsza. This chapter aims to answer the question of how Jonas Staal, 
the organisation of New World Summit, and the event ‘Artist Organisations International’ not only 
shaped the public involvement outside of Azawad but also played an influential role in how the public 
perceived the exhibition on Azawad by trying to occupy the space between art and activism. The 
previous chapters have shown that within Azawad, although the works are visual, they occur within 
the space of activism. Staal brought the works to an art gallery context, problematizing this art-activist 
interstice.  
It is clear from the previous two chapters that earlier versions of nationalism and its visual 
manifestations have influenced the visual work coming from Azawad, in both the use of the flag and 
monuments. Jonas Staal, aside from bringing the Azawad project to BAK and the AOI, wrote several 
papers on Azawad that give an indication of his framing of the visual works. The first part of this 
chapter looks again at the works discussed in chapters one and two but attempts to look at why these 
particular works were chosen by Staal and how he uses them for his argument for a ‘stateless state’.76 
The second section shows how the public that enters the exhibition space is reduced to not only a 
spectator, but argues that the exhibition limits the kind of public that views the exhibition. This 
relationship to the public stands in stark contrast to the interventions created in Azawad. The next 																																																								
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section discusses the use of the concept of the embassy and argues that its problematic power 
structures further undermine the relational aspect of the interventions. Finally, a discussion on ‘Artist 
Organisation International’ shows how the problematic power structures present in the MNLA 
exhibition at BAK continue to be present in these broader scale projects because of the distance 
between the audience and the movement and because Staal uses the MNLA to further his own 
political agenda.  
 
 
3.1 Selection of material and selection of publics  
 
‘The New World Embassy: Azawad’ was an art installation on show from September 6 until October 
12 2014 at Basis voor actuele kunst (BAK) in Utrecht, the Netherlands. The exhibition was spread 
across two floors, including a banner on the outside of the building showing the flag of Azawad and 
the title of the project and the name Azawad in three languages: French, Arabic, and Tamasheq. On 
the ground floor photographs taken by Moussa Ag Assarid were displayed along with their 
descriptions. These descriptions were similar to those given in the accompanying book, New World 
Reader #4: The Art of Creating a State (2014). A large map of Azawad was displayed on the fourth 
wall. In the centre of the space black benches surround a black table in the shape of Azawad (Figure 
14). The legs of the table are painted in the colours of the Azawad flag. The grey floor shows a map 
of North West Africa; the section of Azawad correlates to the placing of the table—Azawad is raised 
up from the surrounding countries. On the second floor fragments of the documentary ‘Azawad, the 
Art of Creating a State’ are displayed. The room has been darkened to aid with seeing the displays. 
The inauguration of the ‘embassy’ took place on September 9 2014 (Figure13), making use of the 
table and benches by arranging the speakers around it creation a discussion about Azawad, on 
Azawad.77 Participants included the artists involved in creating the projects: Jonas Staal and Moussa 
Ag Assarid as well as Jolle Demmers from the Center for Conflict Studies at Utrecht University, 
Mahamadou Dieri Maïga, vice president of the Transitional Council of the State of Azawad, Jasper 
van Dijk of the Dutch Socialist Party, journalist Arnold Karskens and Jeroen Zandberg from 
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.78 The aim of the embassy and its surrounding 
events are clear: allow for a public discussion where the invited speakers are able to not only critique 
the project, but also suggest solutions for the problem of achieving independence. In order to 
understand the role the exhibition has in navigating the boundary between art and activism several 
questions must be answered. The first is on the selection of the material in both the exhibition and 
accompanying reader. What context does Jonas Staal provide the audience and how does this shape 
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their participation? Subsequently, in line with the previous chapters, how does this form of 
participation relate to relational aesthetics and how does it deal with the problems of power? 
In his paper ‘To Make a World, Part I: Ultranationalism and the Art of the Stateless State’ 
Jonas Staal argues in favour of Stateless internationalism, describing it as the attempt to redefine the 
cultural communities beyond spatial and ethnic boundaries. Staal argues these movements attempt to 
go beyond the nation-state79 and that Azawad is the creation of a stateless state. The strategy of the 
works discussed in the previous two chapters is described as “liberation through the state from the 
state”80 clarifying that the emphasis here is on how a group of people can create a state for 
themselves.81 The interventions are described as counter-performances—since they are actions taken 
against the governing state of Mali—but it is clear that they continue to use the language of the state. 
Ultimately, Staal’s discussion focuses on the problematic history of the region and its current political 
climate. The images function as the illustration for an increasingly general argument, namely the end 
of the current concept of a static state, not an end to the nation. For Staal, only a state that continually 
questions itself and its own history can properly represent its people since an established state will 
enforce the creation of minorities (multiple nationalities) and an ‘other’.82 However, as was discussed 
in the first chapter, the ‘other’ is a temporal notion, subject to change, but remains so long as the 
community of the nation remains.  
By placing the interventions in a broader context, Staal has risked losing the participation of 
the audience in Azawad. Instead, the participation of the audience at the New World Embassy is 
limited to the involvement of experts and the three-day seminar for students. The consequence of this 
is that, while the goal of the embassy is to involve the public, it functions on a portion of the public: 
the part that is invited to participate. This is different than the works created in Azawad that, as far as 
it is possible to know, need no invitation for the public to participate.  
 There are two problems entailed in this invitation to participation. The first is that it lacks 
free participation of the public. While the exhibition is created to encourage discussion on a cultural 
and political level, it remains an event away from the public space. The public forum limits the 
public’s interaction to the level of asking questions at the end of the session meaning that the public is 
reduced to their role as a spectator presented with a finished visual work which can only be 
challenged in a limited form. This limitation is reinforced by the space of the exhibition namely, a 
gallery. Staal’s intention for a space, which “explores the intersection of art, theory, and activism by 
temporarily instituting an operational embassy as an extraterritorial space of representation, 
negotiation, and international exchange”83 is only partially fulfilled in terms of negotiation and 
international exchange. If the project describes itself, as it does in the reader, as a move away from the 																																																								
79 Staal 2014b, 9. 
80 Ibid, 10. 
81 Staal 2014c, 6-10. 
82 Ibid, 12. 
83 Staal, New World Embassy - Azawad n.d. 
Amelie de Haan 
s11989855 
 33 
public as mere spectators and a shift towards participation and proposition84 there must be a critical 
stance taken when this is not the case. The gallery remains an institution with its history of viewing 
the public as a spectator and the forum does nothing to change this. If one of the roles of relational 
aesthetics is to bring different groups who would normally not interact together, then the exhibition 
and subsequent events in the space do not do this. However, the exhibition and the events do allow the 
public to become familiar with groups that they would not normally see.  
The second problem with the invitation to participation comes in the form of autonomy and 
power of the artist. Showing the photographs in a gallery removes the question of legitimacy of the art 
object since it is shown in an art space while simultaneously reinforcing the authorial autonomy of the 
artist. Landi Raubenheimer in ‘Secret/Wish, the problem of the object in relational aesthetics’ (2015) 
discusses the problematic role of the object in works that pertain to be relational. Raubenheimer refers 
to the Cartesian model, which places the object at the center of the aesthetic experience and implies 
that the spectator is left with no choice but to accept the gaze of the author (in the case of the New 
World Embassy: Staal) and places the work back into the realm of the creation of objects and the 
spectator’s role of contemplating these objects85. Unlike the events shown in the photographs that are 
re-presented in the BAK exhibition, the focus here is not on art as a social event but instead on place. 
Staal taking on the role as presenter of these photographs to a different public—that is, a public 
outside of Azawad—means that the relational aspect that formed the events in the photographs does 
not by default translate to this new presentation. The status of the photographs as documents allows 
for them to be manipulated for a specific cause. This is because photographs are anachronistic; 
Raubenheimer discusses Jean Baudrillard’s view that antiques are anachronistic because they are 
“removed from the present moment”. 86 We can extend this criterion to documentary photographs 
since they present an event that has already passed. This makes them become raw material for new 
works87 and then allows for a re-presentation in the context of a gallery exhibition as opposed to 
representation.  
If we consider social exchange as being part of what makes the visual interventions sit on the 
boundary of art and activism, the lack of this social exchange in the exhibition shows that it does not 
sit on this boundary. Staal puts the spectator in a problematic position, the works, taken out of their 
context, have become a passive recipient of the gaze of the spectator whose approach—we can 
assume because the exhibition takes place in Utrecht (the Netherlands)—is from a Western 
perspective. If the forum and exhibition are there to promote international exchange and an 
understanding of the nationalist position of the Azawad project there has to be a challenge to this 
spectator position. Additionally, there must be a questioning of the position of Jonas Staal—																																																								
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particularly if the assumption of the work is that Staal has no position. The position Staal takes is 
unclear in the format of the exhibition and the AOI project. The photographs are displayed in the first 
and representatives of the MNLA hold a lecture in the latter. Staal does take a position outside of 
these two frameworks—he makes a clear stand in the papers he publishes on the subject. 
By not acknowledging the power and authorial autonomy he has in his own work, Staal 
leaves the spectator in a position where they must assume the power of disseminating the work 
without being provided a counterbalance to their own gaze. While this can lead to the public being 
educated about the political and cultural situation in Azawad as was part of the aim of the exhibition, 
it does so with the reinforcement of the public’s own context, Staal displays a wealth of information 
but with very little structure. The public has to make sense of it on their own. In the foreword of the 
Reader Maria Hlavajova, artistic director of BAK argues that this project shifts “art’s logic … from 
mere critique to proposition”88 but fails to account that the artist does this proposition without input 
from the public. Hlavajova continues, arguing that this project (the Azawad embassy exhibition) is 
different since it does not “hide in the symbolic safety of an art institution and thus away from the 
world they take as their subject”89 but this is precisely what is happening. The safety of an art 
institution allows for the exhibition to be seen as a finalized project, even if this is not the intention of 
the artists; at the time of the exhibition at BAK, an independent Azawad was far from being realized.  
 
 
3.2 Informing a public  
 
If the exhibition cannot be a form of relational aesthetics and involve the spectator in the creation of 
the intervention, how does it attempt to achieve its goal? The answer here lies in the visual form that 
the exhibition takes, namely, its focus on information. The wall on which photographs were presented 
together with text is an example of this emphasis on transfer of knowledge. One result of this is that 
without attending the specific events organised during the exhibition, the location becomes a hub not 
for propositions or possibilities but instead functions as a document. If the interventions shown in the 
photographs can be considered as forms of relational aesthetics, can the documents of these 
interventions function in the same way?  
 The use of archival material is problematic because of the representations of the real. The 
documents come with their own rhetoric, they are already created in the attempt to persuade the 
spectator of a specific point. This means that the presentation of the photographs in the form of the 
museum or art gallery comes with the challenge of re-reading the documents, thereby creating a 
rhetoric of rhetoric. This is because the items themselves already have rhetoric.90 The square in Kidal, 																																																								
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the flags on people’s clothes and the walls are already attempting to convince you of something, 
namely that Azawad is a nation. The re-presenting of the photographs serves as proof outside of the 
immediate region but also means they will be read differently purely by being presented in a different 
context. It is not enough to present purely the photographs, the rhetoric of rhetoric lies in the addition 
of other information such as the captions, the table, map, and talks. Interestingly, it is clear that 
bringing the works to a wider audience is the aim of the photographs (instead of being purely intended 
as document). In interviews with the creators of the banners in the photographs and the photographer 
they state that this is their original intended purpose, to show the “visual signs of an insurgent 
Azawad”.91 The rhetoric developed in the exhibition in which the photographs are used is most likely 
not the same; we know this because while the MNLA consistently presents itself as an imagined 
community (as shown in chapters one and two), Staal instead focuses on the concept of the stateless 
state92. This state exists through permanent revolution, continually “questioning its own history, 
language symbols, and the very meaning of a ‘people’”93 and thereby not allowing power to be 
monopolized. This change in rhetoric shows that Staal attributes the photographs with a specific 
agency, the result of which is that the subject of the photograph does not exist in multiple 
“communicative situations”.94 Claire Bishop discusses this term in her essay ‘Antagonism and 
Relational Aesthetics’ (2004) on the increasing existence of participatory exhibitions. These situations 
occur when an artist produces something new which allows them to have a different relationship with 
their audience. In her critique of Bourriaud she briefly discusses Umberto Eco who argued that all art 
can be interpreted in an infinite number of ways. This interpretation proposed by Umberto Eco is 
closely related to Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics but differing in the fact that there is no need for the 
spectator to fulfil a role in the creation of the work. This is where the shift occurs from a project in 
which the public forms part of the development process to one where the proposition (that of a 
stateless state) is done by Jonas Staal.  
 A second difference is that while Bourriaud sees the work as producing conditions,95 as 
discussed by Bishop, Eco sees works as reflecting those conditions.96 In both cases it is possible to 
speak of interventions that take place on the boundary of art and activism. The reason for this is that 
although Staal does not involve the public in the way the works created in the photographs do, the act 
of proposing an action for change is still present in the exhibition. Again, this call to change is limited 
because the intervention takes place inside an art space instead of in the public space. BAK is argued 
to be a space of interlocution, a space between art, knowledge and advocacy as is written in the book 
																																																								
91 Touré in Staal 2014c, 11. 
92 Staal 2014c, 12. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Bishop 2004, 62. 
95 Bourriaud describes these as “collective encounters”, Bourriaud in Bishop 2006a, 163. 
96 Ibid. 
Amelie de Haan 
s11989855 
 36 
that accompanied the exhibition.97 While its aims can be to be a space of this type, this does not 
negate the fact that it is presenting a visual intervention in the form of an exhibition. The space, when 
not used for an event, takes on the characteristics of an archive. However, this archive is not a tactile 
archive; visitors cannot alter or interact with it, only observe it. The facts of the movement have 
been—at least for the duration of the exhibition—permanently attached to the wall (Figure 14). This 
is where the work fails to exist in the form of creating relationships between the different people in 
the public and Staal—the works are optical, removing the ability to create human relationships which 
then removes the emancipatory element since it is constrained.98 
 
3.3 The embassy as performance  
 
The final part of the exhibition to discuss is the building’s naming and use as an embassy. An 
embassy is defined as “The body of persons sent on a mission, or as a deputation, to a sovereign, etc.; 
the ambassador and his retinue, with their surroundings; also, the official residence of the 
ambassador.”99 The embassy has a diplomatic mission; its workers are foreign representatives of the 
nation. They play an intermediary role for those who cannot visit the country they are from, they 
serve in a way as a proxy for the state they represent. They are considered the domain of whatever 
state own it and can provide visitors with both cultural and political information. This is part of what 
the Azawad Embassy tried to do, it functioned “as an embassy workspace for Azawadian 
representatives to establish international relations and seek cultural acknowledgement”.100 This 
acknowledgement requires the participation of the audience at the exhibition; this is what makes the 
work relational.  
These rituals, which begin by acknowledging the legitimacy of the state of the embassy you 
are entering, are inherently social and provide opportunities for the general public to participate in the 
discussion but rely mostly on a contribution from the artists and those representing the nation. The 
relational element of the exhibition is not located in the works displayed or the public forum; instead 
it is naming the space an embassy that provides the invitation for the public to participate. Jonas Staal, 
the artist who facilitated the creation of the embassy, wanted to ask the question of whether the state 
needed to be recognised in order to recognise the existence of the embassy.101 The space functions as 
one that caters to both art and activism. The photographs and video presented inside the space give the 
embassy a specific agency, which is precisely what Claire Bishop argues should be avoided if the 
focus of the project is on establishing relations and acquiring cultural acknowledgment.102  																																																								
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The embassy carries with it the idea that it is from another nation, representing another group 
of people. It exists within the context of current notions of statehood; the characteristic of the embassy 
is included in that. By naming the exhibition an embassy Staal places the power of the exhibition 
directly with that of the state of Azawad. In failing to see or acknowledge this placement of power, 
the aim of building social relationships is undermined. The exhibition cannot be both an 
extraterritorial space and an embassy; it cannot be both a space seeking cultural acknowledgement 
from a public and simultaneously listen to that public.  
 
 
3.4 Greater context of the Summits – The artist as facilitator 
 
The broader context of the Embassy project in Utrecht is important because it gives clues of how 
Jonas Staal, the facilitator of this project, views not only the interaction between the different 
participants but also his position on the boundary of art and activism and the subsequent problems that 
arise when one artist’s work is re-presented by another. ‘Artist Organisations International’ (AOI), 
organised in January 2015 in Berlin, is not described as a conference or symposium but as an 
International.  It is unclear why this decision was made, it could be to avoid falling with the typical 
arts conference stereotype, though one could say that the invited speakers such as the MNLA would 
have ensured it wasn’t a typical conference. It was a three-day event in which different groups such as 
artist groups, and representatives of under-represented groups of people, presented their work and on 
the last day took part in a final debate. The groups were chosen because they all dealt with a crisis in 
“politics, economy, education, immigration and ecology”,103 specifically addressing what this meant 
in artistic and political terms. Alongside Jonas Staal, AOI was organised by two curators, Florian 
Malzacher and Joanna Warsza.  
Since primary sources suggest that the term International was not popular104—the term did 
not have full consensus from the different groups involved—focusing on the aim of providing 
“alternative parliaments”105 can be seen as a way keeping the focus of the different projects broad. 
The function of these ‘parliaments’ is to discuss the state without being a direct part of it. The 
project’s aim for Staal was to allow for a space in which the groups involved in the International 
could self-organise106. We can see the AOI as being an umbrella organisation for the projects 
presented in it, since the presentation of the MNLA was not given by Jonas Staal, but instead by 
Moussa Ag Assarid, the European representative of the MNLA organisation. Staal and the other two 
organisers invited the groups who presented their visual interventions. Many different artist 																																																								
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organisations were present but other groups who fight for the rights of various other groups of people 
were also included. These groups presented their works in the form of a presentation. The event 
consisted of several debates with topics such as ‘Learning & Unlearning’, ‘Stateless & Statelessness’, 
‘Violence & Non-Violence’. Moussa Ag Assarid spoke during the section on ‘Learning & 
Unlearning’.107 Unlike the participatory elements used by the public within Azawad, the interventions, 
once they have already been created and photographed, take on the role as documents that serve to 
provide audience with evidence of the nationalist rituals. As described in the second chapter, these 
rituals allow both a questioning of the current power and the creation and legitimization of new 
power. Additionally, the discussions were held amongst those who were invited to speak, meaning 
that the International runs into the same issue as the Embassy. The participatory element of the 
interventions falls away when they are presented as documentary evidence and when the audience is 
only allowed to ask questions instead of assuming their own agency.  
In the paper Staal writes on the MNLA, ‘To Make a World, Part II: The Art of Creating a 
State’ (2014) he makes his intentions clear. While describing the movement and its history, his focus 
is on how it stands in contrast to the French state, Mali, and the Islamic terrorist groups trying to take 
over in the area.108 His paper includes two questions and a proposal: “our question … is, how we can 
liberate democracy from our states? How do we redefine the practice of democracy without the 
construct of the state? Our liberation, I believe, is to enact, in the face of the total states arising before 
us, a stateless democracy”109 Staal’s interest is not only political, but it additionally wants the reader 
to view Azawad as a nation without typical identifiers of a state. What Staal fails to realize is that in 
the visual imagery created by the movement continues attempts are made to legitimize the nation. 
This legitimization occurs in the use of the flag, the creation of a border, as well as Staal’s own 
addition with the creation of the embassy. All of these are rituals of nationalism and therefore serve to 
legitimize the state of Azawad within the framework that already existed. 
 
As has been shown in this chapter, one of the greatest problems facing works on the boundary of art 
and activism is in the role of the public. By failing to address this in the exhibition in BAK, Staal 
reduces the relational visual interventions shown in the first and second chapter to a power structure 
in which the public is unable to participate, only observe. This does eliminate the issue of having to 
legitimize the political side of the argument; the photographs and texts are relayed as facts and appear 
to fit with what would visually be considered a nation. The issue is that since the exhibition at BAK is 
meant to be an embassy for a country, the audience is immediately placed in the role of a silent 
‘other’. The audience, by virtue of not being able to be part of the ‘self’ here, is placed in a role where 
they look from the outside in. Through the accompanying texts, Staal increases the distance between 																																																								
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the two even more. The context of the gallery space means the discussion takes part more within the 
context of art than activism.  
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Conclusion 
 
The 2012 uprising ended in a ceasefire in the summer of 2017, squashing the MNLA’s dream to form 
an independent nation.110 However, the material evidence of this potential nation remains and shows a 
region’s attempt at creating a multicultural visual identity. This thesis has attempted to describe the 
visual language of this movement and the way in which a public is transformed into producers to 
create relational works. Through showing this it is possible to deduce that the tactic of creating this 
multicultural visual identity lies in the limiting of symbols and the inclusion of what would otherwise 
be a public without agency.  
 The theoretical framework of this thesis was multi-disciplinary to allow for a greater 
understanding of how nationalist ideology is formed through visual culture. The MNLA and the 
people of Azawad use tactics of banal nationalism as a method of claiming that the nation already 
exists in a quest to limit doubt. Meaning that the forms in which these visual elements are used would, 
in any stable nation, be considered examples of banal nationalism. However, because of the unstable 
nature of Azawad, the banal tactics become forms of hot nationalism. These works are no doubt forms 
of visual activism as the first two chapters show. The third chapter shows that display within an art 
context creates a problematic position since the documents already exist and the public has reduced 
agency. Jonas Staal’s influence in the international dissemination of what the MNLA was trying to 
achieve cannot be underestimated. He is an artist who has an agenda but is also clear about that 
agenda in the writing he produces. Problems arise within the exhibition context and show that if 
anything, the interstice between art and activism is difficult to determine.  
 By using Bourriaud’s theory on relational aesthetics in conjunction with Laclau’s description 
of transparency, chapter one has shown that the creation of the ‘self’ in opposition to the ‘other’ is 
necessary for the creation of a nationalist identity. The second chapter built on that by arguing that the 
flag as central symbol for the nation allowed for a wide range of individuals and groups to become 
involved in the making process of the works. These translations of the flag show that this symbol is 
not sacred. The final chapter did not introduce any other theoretical framework but instead built upon 
the framework started in the first two chapters. By expanding on the way the source material is used, 
we can get a clearer view of how nationalist activism has difficulty translating into another context. 
The important thing to note is the effect that occurs when documentation of activist actions are shown 
within an art context. The outside public, in the context of Azawad, the ‘other’, cannot fully 
participate in the works, nor can their experience of it be within the interstice since the outside public 
doesn’t participate in the ritual of the nation, at most it could de-legitimize. 
 There remains a wealth of material to explore, both in the context of Azawad and other 
potential visual works of proposed nations. In particular the concept of the border as a monument 
within an unstable environment can be fruitful in a more global discourse. Additionally, the 																																																								
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contemporary use of the monument to convey nationalist ideology within multicultural nations has 
potential since it would also require a reduction in the types of symbols used. The flag as a 
representative of groups, both national groups and minority groups can be researched within the 
context of public interaction with this symbol. The necessary element for these topics is 
interdisciplinary research, without which it would have been impossible to come to the conclusions 
presented in this thesis. 
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Figure 1. Map of State of Azawad, declared by the Tuareg-majority MNLA rebel group in Mali.  
Modified from Wikimedia map by Orionist, incorporating images by Carport and NordNordWest. 
License: CC BY-SA. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Northern_Mali_conflict.svg 
 
Figure 2. Hurlbert, Donald. Independence Monument. In Arnoldi, Bamako, Mali: Monuments and 
Modernity in the Urban Imagination 2007, 10.  
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Figure 3. Touré, Mazou Ibrahim. Taken by: Assarid, Moussa Ag. A previously unnamed sculpture 
painted in the colors of the Azawadian flag by calligrapher Mazou Ibrahim Touré. Today, it is 
regarded as a monument of independence. In Staal, New World Reader #4 2014, 154. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Taken by: Darius Wiejaczka. Timbuktu, Mali: Sankore mosque. 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Timbuktu-Mali 
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Figure 5. Touré, Mazou Ibrahim. Taken by:Staal, Jonas. Murals by artist Mazou Ibrahim Touré in 
Ménaka, Azawad. In Staal, New World Reader #4 2014, 50. 
 
 
Figure 6. Figure 5. Assarid, Moussa Ag. Slogans and graffiti in the streets of Kidal. In Staal, New  
World Reader #4 2014, 166.  
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Figure 7. Taken by: Assarid, Moussa Ag. A very important place, the Square of the Freedom of the 
Azawadian People, where children, youth, and women gather to place flags and plants, the latter 
commemorating martyrs, with each plant bearing the name of a lost one. The surviving families take 
care of the plants in order to keep in memory the sacrifice of martyrs and their contribution to the 
ongoing struggle of the Azawadian people. In Staal, New World Reader #4 2014, 170. 
 
 
Figure 8. Banner by: Touré, Mazou Ibrahim. Taken by: Assarid, Moussa Ag. Demonstrators, mainly 
women and youth, opposing the presence of the Malian army in Kidal on 2 May 2014. In Staal, New 
World Reader #4 2014, 157.  
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Figure 9. Taken by: Assarid, Moussa Ag. Indication of the borders of Azawad in the middle of the 
desert. In Staal, New World Reader #4 2014, 145. 
 
 
Figure 10. Taken by: Assarid, Moussa Ag. Gateway to the city of Ménaka, Azawad. In Staal, New 
World Reader  
#4 2014, 49. 
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Figure 11. Taken by: Assarid, Moussa Ag. A decorative flag on clothes. There are now even people 
who tattoo the flag of Azawad on their skin. In Staal, New World Reader #4 2014, 171. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Taken by: Assarid, Moussa Ag. The Women’s Association of the MNLA created a large 
tent made of goat and sheep skin, decorated with Azawadian flags, which made it possible for dozens 
of women and men to come together between 29 April-2 May 2014 to listen to proposals and 
discussions concerning the future of the Azawadian Project. In Staal, New World Reader #4 2014, 
146. 
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Figure 13. Jonas Staal, “New World Embassy: Azawad”, 2014. http://jonasstaal.nl/projects/new- 
world-embassy-azawad/ 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Jonas Staal, “New World Embassy: Azawad”, 2014. http://jonasstaal.nl/projects/new- 
world-embassy-azawad/ 	  
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